Assessing Strategic Risk

In recent decades, the concept of subjective probability has been increasingly applied to an adversary’s choices in strategic games. A careful examination reveals that the standard construction of subjective probabilities does not apply in this context. We show how the difficulty may be overcome by means of a different construction, and provide an axiomatic fondation for it.

When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect ?

Modern game theory was born in 1928, when John von Neumann published his Minimax Theorem. This theorem ascribes to all two-person zero-sum games a value - what rational players may expect - and optimal strategies - how they should play to achieve that expectation. Seventy-seven years later, strategic game theory has not gotten beyond that initial point, insofar as the basic questions of value and optimal strategies are concerned. Equilibrium theories do not tell players how to play and what to expect; even when there is a unique Nash equilibrium, it is not at all clear that the players “should” play this equilibrium, nor that they should expect its payoff. Here, we return to square one : abandon all ideas of equilibrium and simply ask, how should rational players play, and what should they expect. We provide answers to both questions, for all n-persons games in strategic form.

Proof-theoretic Analysis of Rationality for Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets

In the context of strategic games, we provide an axiomatic proof of the statement Common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Rationality here means playing only strategies one believes to be best responses. This involves looking at two formal languages. One is first-order, and is used to formalise optimality conditions, like avoiding strictly dominated strategies, or playing a best response. The other is a modal fixpoint language with expressions for optimality, rationality and belief. Fixpoints are used to form expressions for common belief and for iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies.Comment: 16 pages, Proc. 11th International Workshop on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems (CLIMA XI). To appea

Robust Pricing with Refunds

Before purchase, a buyer of an experience good learns about the product's fit using various information sources, including some of which the seller may be unaware of. The buyer, however, can conclusively learn the fit only after purchasing and trying out the product. We show that the seller can use a simple mechanism to best take advantage of the buyer's post-purchase learning to maximize his guaranteed-profit. We show that this mechanism combines a generous refund, which performs well when the buyer is relatively informed, with non-refundable random discounts, which work well when the buyer is relatively uninformed. JEL: D82, C79, D4

Coulomb and nuclear breakup effects in the single neutron removal reaction 197Au(17C,16C gamma)X

We analyze the recently obtained new data on the partial cross sections and parallel momentum distributions for transitions to ground as well as excited states of the 16C core, in the one-neutron removal reaction 197Au(17C,16C gamma)X at the beam energy of 61 MeV/nucleon. The Coulomb and nuclear breakup components of the one-neutron removal cross sections have been calculated within a finite range distorted wave Born approximation theory and an eikonal model, respectively. The nuclear contributions dominate the partial cross sections for the core excited states. By adding the nuclear and Coulomb cross sections together, a reasonable agreement is obtained with the data for these states. The shapes of the experimental parallel momentum distributions of the core states are described well by the theory.Comment: Revtex format, two figures included, to appear in Phys. Rev. C. (Rapid communications

Graphical models for interactive POMDPs: representations and solutions

We develop new graphical representations for the problem of sequential decision making in partially observable multiagent environments, as formalized by interactive partially observable Markov decision processes (I-POMDPs). The graphical models called interactive inf uence diagrams (I-IDs) and their dynamic counterparts, interactive dynamic inf uence diagrams (I-DIDs), seek to explicitly model the structure that is often present in real-world problems by decomposing the situation into chance and decision variables, and the dependencies between the variables. I-DIDs generalize DIDs, which may be viewed as graphical representations of POMDPs, to multiagent settings in the same way that IPOMDPs generalize POMDPs. I-DIDs may be used to compute the policy of an agent given its belief as the agent acts and observes in a setting that is populated by other interacting agents. Using several examples, we show how I-IDs and I-DIDs may be applied and demonstrate their usefulness. We also show how the models may be solved using the standard algorithms that are applicable to DIDs. Solving I-DIDs exactly involves knowing the solutions of possible models of the other agents. The space of models grows exponentially with the number of time steps. We present a method of solving I-DIDs approximately by limiting the number of other agents’ candidate models at each time step to a constant. We do this by clustering models that are likely to be behaviorally equivalent and selecting a representative set from the clusters. We discuss the error bound of the approximation technique and demonstrate its empirical performance

Socially structured games

We generalize the concept of a cooperative non-transferable utility game by introducing a socially structured game. In a socially structured game every coalition of players can organize themselves according to one or more internal organizations to generate payoffs. Each admissible internal organization on a coalition yields a set of payoffs attainable by the members of this coalition. The strengths of the players within an internal organization depend on the structure of the internal organization and are represented by an exogenously given power vector. More powerful players have the power to take away payoffs of the less powerful players as long as those latter players are not able to guarantee their payoffs by forming a different internal organization within some coalition in which they have more power.we introduce the socially stable core as a solution concept that contains those payoffs that are both stable in an economic sense, i.e., belong to the core of the underlying cooperative game, and stable in a social sense, i.e., payoffs are sustained by a collection of internal organizations of coalitions for which power is distributed over all players in a balanced way. The socially stable core is a subset and therefore a refinement of the core. We show by means of examples that in many cases the socially stable core is a very small subset of the core.we will state conditions for which the socially stable core is non-empty. In order to derive this result, we formulate a new intersection theorem that generalizes the kkms intersection theorem. We also discuss the relationship between social stability and the wellknown concept of balancedness for ntu-games, a sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core. In particular we give an example of a socially structured game that satisfies social stability and therefore has a non-empty core, but whose induced ntu-game does not satisfy balancedness in the general sense of billera

Common knowledge and state-dependent equilibria

Many puzzling social behaviors, such as avoiding eye contact, using innuendos, and insignificant events that trigger revolutions, seem to relate to common knowledge and coordination, but the exact relationship has yet to be formalized. Herein, we present such a formalization. We state necessary and sufficient conditions for what we call state-dependent equilibria - equilibria where players play different strategies in different states of the world. In particular, if everybody behaves a certain way (e.g. does not revolt) in the usual state of the world, then in order for players to be able to behave a different way (e.g. revolt) in another state of the world, it is both necessary and sufficient for it to be common p-believed that it is not the usual state of the world, where common p-belief is a relaxation of common knowledge introduced by Monderer and Samet [16]. Our framework applies to many player r-coordination games - a generalization of coordination games that we introduce - and common (r,p)-beliefs - a generalization of common p-beliefs that we introduce. We then apply these theorems to two particular signaling structures to obtain novel results. © 2012 Springer-Verlag

Breakup reaction models for two- and three-cluster projectiles

Breakup reactions are one of the main tools for the study of exotic nuclei, and in particular of their continuum. In order to get valuable information from measurements, a precise reaction model coupled to a fair description of the projectile is needed. We assume that the projectile initially possesses a cluster structure, which is revealed by the dissociation process. This structure is described by a few-body Hamiltonian involving effective forces between the clusters. Within this assumption, we review various reaction models. In semiclassical models, the projectile-target relative motion is described by a classical trajectory and the reaction properties are deduced by solving a time-dependent Schroedinger equation. We then describe the principle and variants of the eikonal approximation: the dynamical eikonal approximation, the standard eikonal approximation, and a corrected version avoiding Coulomb divergence. Finally, we present the continuum-discretized coupled-channel method (CDCC), in which the Schroedinger equation is solved with the projectile continuum approximated by square-integrable states. These models are first illustrated by applications to two-cluster projectiles for studies of nuclei far from stability and of reactions useful in astrophysics. Recent extensions to three-cluster projectiles, like two-neutron halo nuclei, are then presented and discussed. We end this review with some views of the future in breakup-reaction theory.Comment: Will constitute a chapter of "Clusters in Nuclei - Vol.2." to be published as a volume of "Lecture Notes in Physics" (Springer